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Abstract 
This paper is a discussion on the relevance of compassion regarding human rights in liberal 
states. The study focuses a great deal on detangling and distinguishing compassion from other 
related terms and meanings that are commonly used as equivalent, somewhat differing and 
sometimes separate from each other. For this, Martha Nussbaum’s account on compassion is 
used as a starting-point. Compassion is then applied to human rights in the context of liberal 
states. Moreover, the main conclusion drawn is that compassion, in its most commonly used 
sense, implies an attempt or a response to relieve another from suffering, and consequently, 
the human rights practice in liberal states is present.   
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1 Introduction 
Despite globalization and an increasing moral cosmopolitanism, the state remains the most 
powerful organization within the international system. In this international community, states 
have agreed upon a minimum standard of universal human rights that individuals enjoy 
simply by virtue of being human. Nevertheless, this universality remains highly contested as 
states keep violating these rights. However, inequality is promoted in other ways. For 
example, states are entitled to advance the well-being of its own citizens in preference to the 
well-being of citizens in other states. Given this framework, it is interesting to investigate the 
relevance of theories and disciplines focusing on a common shared humanity. In this paper, it 
is the relevance of compassion in regard to human rights that will be studied. Moreover, since 
the modern liberal state has proven itself to be most successful in attempting to recognize and 
implement human rights norms, it is in this organizational structure that the study of this 
paper takes its starting-point. 
1.1 Purpose of Study 
The overall purpose of this paper is to investigate the relevance that compassion has regarding 
human rights in modern liberal states. A secondary aim is to shed some light on compassion in 
human rights practice, policies and politics, in the political theory covering the modern liberal 
state. On a theoretical level, the aim is to provide some insights into the relationship between 
compassion, human rights and the liberal state. In order to do so, the following research 
question is addressed: 
 
• What is the relevance of compassion regarding human rights in liberal states? 
 
To answer this question, we must first outline the theoretical framework available on the topic 
of compassion and then, apply this to human rights in the discourse of the liberal states.  
1.2 Methodological Considerations 
The study presented in this paper is the result of a conducted literature study on the theoretical 
framework available on the topic of compassion. Further, it is a theoretical study, where the 
matter of compassion is applied to human rights in liberal states. To this date, there is an 
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apparent lack of research on the topic relevant for this paper. Consequently, the material used 
for answering the research question consists of a wide range of useful literature, covering the 
three central subjects of this paper; compassion, human rights and the liberal state. 
 The material used for this study consists out of both scientific articles and non-fiction. 
Further, only secondary source material is used, selected with the relevance of compassion in 
politics in regard. In search of this material, I used the two databases Libris1 and Elin.2 
Although, the search process for material has been extensive, I am aware of the source of 
error involved by limiting the use of databases, and thereby the scope of material. Though, 
this limitation was required in respect of the scope of this study, but also, since the literature 
on the three main subjects present to this paper, are intersecting a variety of other words and 
disciplines in the literature. These are sometimes complementary, sometimes overlapping, and 
sometimes different form one another, which especially is the case in the material used for 
chapter 2, presenting the theoretical framework available on compassion. In finding useful 
keyword combinations for the databases, on the field of compassion, both Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy3 and Compassion The Culture and Politics of an Emotion4 have 
been of inspiration.  
 In order to eliminate the risk of loosing the accuracy of the vocabulary used in literature 
covering the topic of compassion, the decision was early on made, only to use material written 
in English. Another reason for this choice is that an English reader, if interested, will have the 
possibility to read the literature used in its entirety. Further, it should be said that the literature 
used in chapter 3, Human Rights, and chapter 4, The Liberal State, have been selected in order 
to fit the purpose of the study, focusing on the role of compassion regarding human rights in 
liberal stats. There is a broad base of literature available on both terms. The selection 
procedure has, therefore, been conducted in respect to relevant keywords on the topic of 
compassion. Thus, I make no attempt to make a complete representation on the different 
components of this paper, but rather, to present the information required for applying the 
theoretical framework to human rights in liberal states.  
                                                 
1 www.libris.kb.se 
2 www.lub.lu.se 
3 Craig, Edward (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Cornwall: T J International Ltd 1998. 
4 Berlant, Lauren (ed.), Compassion The Culture and Politics of an Emotion, London: Routledge 2004. 
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 In a study of this kind, there are further subjective additions, as a result of method as 
well as of the selection and interpretation of literature. Given these sources of error, I still feel 
it is possible that the purpose of this study can be achieved by scientific, objective research.  
 As previously noted, the method used in this study is of theoretical character, implying 
that the analysis lies on a theoretical level. Since there is a wide range of somewhat differing 
theories on the concept of compassion, an open discussion of the conclusion is vital for 
scientific validity.  
 The paper is intended to be a contribution to the debate on human rights in international 
relations theory, and more specifically in theories on human rights in liberal states. However, 
chapter 2, 3 and 4 can also be read independently from the rest of this paper, for the reader 
who wishes an overview over the specific matters of compassion, human rights or the liberal 
state.  
 Finally, this paper does not have the ambition of giving a complete answer to the 
relevance of compassion in liberal states regarding human rights, nor to determine to what 
extent the liberal state is compassionate. However, it intends to be a contribution to the 
cumulative development of the discipline. 
1.3 Theoretical Approach 
The theoretical analytical apparatus outlined in this paper consists of different theoretical 
approaches within the discourse of compassion. I am aware of the differences, and how they 
would affect the results. However, instead of choosing one definition of compassion to 
analyse the human rights discourse in liberal states theory, I will present an account of 
varying definitions and compassion theories. Martha Nussbaum is one of the most prominent 
scholar on the subject of compassion applied to politics. This is the reason for using 
Nussbaum as a starting point for presenting and discussing the variety of definitions and 
theories available. Nussbaum has developed a scheme of three characteristics that have to be 
fulfilled for compassion. This builds on a similar scheme from Aristotele and is by fellow 
scholars highly criticized. The theorists elaborating on compassion draw on a wide range of 
historical philosophers and other prominent scholars, such as Adam Smith, Arthur 
Schopenhauer, David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Contemporary scholars are, beside Martha 
Nussbaum, Lauren Berlant, Diana Fritz Cates and Lawrence Blum. There is also an 
expanding literature available in both feminist and religious theories that directly or indirectly 
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have their foundation in, or discuss the topic of, compassion. Moreover, the foundation of 
compassion, found in various religions, are used in studies aiming at evaluating to which 
extent people are compassionate. However, it does not lay within the purpose or the scope of 
this paper to investigate this further. There is a variety of studies conducted (with the aim of) 
developing scales for measuring of compassion. The fact that there is a foundation of 
compassion in the religions has made religious and spiritual groups a common group of study. 
Over the resent years, there has also been developed a framework for measuring compassion 
in various compassionate love scales. However, since it is not the scope of this study to aim at 
measuring compassion, this literature will not be addressed.  
 Finally, it should be noted that compassion, in the current debate of international 
politics is frequently used in the terms of ‘compassion fatigue’ and ‘compassionate 
conservatism’. The former has come to describe the response of indifference to the countless 
media news of other fellow human beings suffering worldwide,5 whereas, the latter is a phrase 
that the Republican Party in the United States brands itself with.6 Since the presidential 
campaign in 2000, George W. Bush has promoted a more compassionate form of 
conservatism,7 where the compassionately conservative state in particular wants “to shift its 
economic obligations from redressing poverty to protecting income by taking less from and 
giving less back to workers and citizens.”8 However, compassion in this paper is not 
equivalent or linked with either of the terms mentioned in this sequence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Moeller, Susan, D., Compassion Fatigue How the Media sell Disease, Famine, War and Death, p. 9. 
6 Berlant, Lauren (ed.), ‘Introduction Compassion (and Withholding)’ in Compassion The Culture and Politics of 
an Emotion, p. 1. 
7 Tomasi, John ‘Should Political Liberals be Compassionate Conservatives? Philosophical Foundations of the 
Faith-Based Initiative’ Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation’ (2004) p. 322. 
8 Berlant, Lauren (ed.), ‘Introduction Compassion (and Withholding)’ in Compassion The Culture and Politics of 
an Emotion, p. 2. 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
The word compassion means “fellow-feeling in adversity”9, “to suffer together with” … or to 
… “feel pity”10 and originates from Latin; The prefix com- meaning with, “together, in 
combination or union”11 and  passion meaning “suffering of pain”.12 Some of the most 
frequently used synonyms in the context of compassion are ‘pity’, ‘sympathy’, ‘empathy’ and 
‘loving-kindness’, but also, ‘tolerance’, ‘goodness’, ‘tenderness’, ‘love’, ‘mercy’, 
‘benevolence’, ‘kind-heartedness’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘forgiveness’.13 Since these terms are, 
amongst different scholars and even in different writings, sometimes used as equivalent to one 
another, sometimes as separate or even distinct from one another, there will be, in what 
follows, a presentation of the discourse on the theoretical framework available. It is important 
to untangle compassion from other terms, which are not necessarily synonymous with 
compassion. It is, however, important to differentiate subtle distinctions, in order to examine 
compassion. 
2.1 Compassion – Emotion and Virtue 
In the discourse available on the subject, compassion is mostly categorised as an emotion. 
However, the word emotion is commonly recognized as equivalent to feeling.14 A person is 
compassionate or feels compassion. Thus, compassion is an embodied feeling.15 Emotions are 
also described as feelings with a genetic basis, which is universal to the human species. The 
management of emotions that reflects their appearance is culturally conditioned, which can be 
exemplified with some commonly named emotions such as love, anger, grief and joy.16 
Emotions influence the ways in which we engage in and respond to others and they also 
underpin political practices and values. Further, they reveal what is important to us, what 
effects us, what we value, and how we should respond ethically.17  
                                                 
9 Onions, C. T. (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 197. 
10 Simpson, J. A. and Weiner, E. S. C. (prepared by), The Oxford English Dictionary 3 p. 597. 
11 Onions, C. T. (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 193. 
12 Ibid., p. 656. 
13 Longman Synonym Dictionary, Second impression, p. 197. 
14 Onions, C. T. (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 310. 
15 Woodward, Kathleen, ‘Calculating Compassion’ in Berlant, Lauren (ed.) Compassion The Culture and 
Politics of an Emotion, p. 73. 
16 Kurtz, Lester (ed.), Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace & Conflict 1 p. 331. 
17 Porter, Elisabeth, ‘Can Politics Practice Compassion?’ 21:4 Hypatia (2006) p. 97. 
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 Diana Fritz Cates, one of our times prominent scholars on the subject of compassion, 
acknowledges how the emotions have received significant philosophical interest over recent 
decades. Two streams contributing to the pool of literature on the topic of emotion are the 
ethics of virtue, developed mostly out of Thomistic and Aristotelian ethical traditions, and 
feminism, including amongst other, ethical investigations of the role of emotions in moral 
life.18 
 When it comes to elaborating on compassion and its applicability to politics, Martha 
Nussbaum is one of the most well-known theorists of modern times, occurring in practical all 
literature on the topic. In the book Upheavals of Thought she explores the emotion of 
compassion one experiences in observing someone else suffering. According to Nussbaum, 
compassion rests on three beliefs;19 First, the suffering is serious, not trivial; Second, the 
suffering was not caused deliberately by the person’s own culpable actions; Third, one’s own 
possibilities are similar to those of the suffered.20 Nussbaum builds this on a similar scheme 
from Aristotle.21 
 It is, in Nussbaum’s expression of compassion, enough that the individual experiences 
the different terms of compassion, for a motive to help to arise.22  Throughout the discourse 
on compassion, the condition of response, or, that it implies action, is fundamental.23 
However, according to Blum and Solomon, in Dutton and others, the response does not have 
to remedy or eliminate suffering for compassion to exist, but there must be a movement to 
respond.24 
                                                 
18 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 326-7. 
19 Fierke, K. M., ‘Whereof we can speak, thereof we must not be silent: trauma, political solipsism and war’ 30 
Review of International Studies (2004) pp. 473-474. 
20 Nussbaum, Martha C., ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’ 20:2 
Political Theory (1992) p. 237. Hower, as Weber notes, Nussbaum acknowledges, in her more recent work, that 
we can and maybe should have compassion for people who are at fault for their own suffering (Weber, M., 
‘Compassion and Pity: An Evaluation of Nussbaum’s Analysis and Defense’ 7 Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice (2004) p. 495). 
21 Fierke, K. M., ‘Whereof we can speak, thereof we must not be silent: trauma, political solipsism and war’ 30 
Review of International Studies (2004) p. 473. 
22 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 335.  
23 See for example: von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 
Nursing Inquiry (2000) pp. 170-171. , Dutton, Jane E., Worline, Monica C., Frost., Peter J. and Lilius, Jacoba, 
‘Explaining Compassion Organizing’ 51 Administrative Science Quarterly pp. 60-61. and Porter, Elisabeth, ‘Can 
Politics Practice Compassion?’ 21:4 Hypatia (2006) p. 101.  
24 Dutton, Jane E., Worline, Monica C., Frost., Peter J. and Lilius, Jacoba, ‘Explaining Compassion Organizing’ 
51 Administrative Science Quarterly pp. 60-61. 
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 However, there are other points where Nussbaum is highly criticized, and, in particular 
on the arguments that compassion requires that the one suffering has not brought the suffering 
on her or himself25 and that “Compassion is properly felt only when harm is done to a good 
person, or when the suffering is a result of other than bad choice.”26 In opposition to 
Nussbaum’s theories, Cates argues that, “It is possible to make a moral judgment concerning 
someone’s action or character, to hold him fully responsible for a serious failure, and to feel 
compassion for him at the same time.”27 According to Cates, making the issue of not being at 
fault, a necessary condition of compassion, would make compassion very rare.28 
Whitebrook’s critique on Nussbaum’s requirements on compassion, as only extending to 
innocent victims, is that the point of the virtue, instead of this limited use, rather might be to 
extend it to those who do not deserve it.29 
 In a wide range of the studied literature, compassion is not seen merely as an emotion, 
but as a social or moral virtue.30 This argument is found for example in both Nussbaum, who 
makes compassion the central virtue, and Cates, who argues that compassion ought to be 
constructed, not simply as an emotion, but as a virtue. Further, Brian Carr discusses, in the 
article ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’, how the altruistic emotions of compassion 
and pity might be seen as social virtues.31 To Carr compassion implies a way of indicating 
how people should respond to those who are suffering.32 
 While compassion, as von Dietze and Orb notes in the article ‘Compassionate care: a 
moral dimension of nursing’, may require or contain emotion, it has an additional rational 
dimension. This is the notion of deliberative altruistic sharing in another person’s suffering 
and can be viewed as an essential bridge to justice. Further, compassion in this way demands 
                                                 
25 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 336. (Se also: Whitebrook (2002) p. 534.) 
26 Whitebrook, Maureen, ‘Compassion as a Political Virtue’ 50 Political Studies (2002) p. 531. 
27 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 336. (Se also: Weber, M., (2004), p. 495). 
28 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 338. 
29 Whitebrook, Maureen, ‘Compassion as a Political Virtue’ 50 Political Studies (2002) p. 534. 
30 von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 Nursing Inquiry 
(2000) p. 166. 
31 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) p. 428. 
32 Cates, Diana Fritz, ‘Conceiving Emotions: Martha Nussbaum’s Upheavals of Thought’ 31:2 Journal of 
Religious Ethics (2003) pp. 338. 
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us to act.33 According to von Dietze and Orb, compassion is based not only on sentiment, but 
on rational thoughts and evaluation. Similarly, Pedro Ortega Ruiz and Ramón Mínguez 
explain that compassion as a feeling becomes moral when reason intervenes.34 In this context, 
Porter emphasizes the interplay between the universality of justice and the particularity of 
compassion. According to Bubeck, in Porter, compassion “helps us recognize our justice 
obligations to those distant from us”. Moreover, according to Porter, the defence of the need 
for compassion is as much a defence for justice. In respect to this, Porter agrees with 
Nussbaum, that compassion is intimately related to justice and rights.35 
 Nussbaum further refers to for example Homer’s Odyssey and Rousseau’s Emile in 
order to point at that compassion requires the recognition of a shared humanity36 This point is 
commonly noted in the literature, exemplified by Carr, who states that, “The sense of ‘shared 
humanity’ is a very broad sense of being ‘equally human’.”37 Furthermore, Bunch, in Porter 
emphasizes the equal worth of every person’s humanity as crucial to compassion.38 One last 
example of this is found in von Dietze and Orb who refer to Nouwen and others, making the 
point that “on one level compassion seems to be such an obvious reaction to human suffering, 
that being accused of lacking compassion is almost synonymous with being accused of 
lacking humanity. This assumes link between compassion and humanity” and that compassion 
requires us to transcend traditional distinctions and boundaries. Thus, compassion is a deep 
sense of solidarity with those who are suffering.39  
 Who then, decides for the case of true compassion? “Nussbaum is clear as to ‘who 
decides’ on what constitutes occasions for compassion: not ‘the actual point of view of each 
and every sufferer’ but that of a reflective spectator” “equipped with ‘a notion of the good, of 
flourishing’, ‘who asks which reversals are of true importance and which are not’40” Carr 
refers to Lawrence Blum as one who has offered an undermining of Nussbaum’s case for the 
                                                 
33 von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 Nursing Inquiry 
(2000) p. 168. 
34 Ortega Ruiz, Pedro and Mínguez, Ramón, ‘Global Inequality and the Need for Compassion: issues in moral 
and political education’ 30:2 Journal of Moral Education p. 163. 
35 Porter, Elisabeth, ‘Can Politics Practice Compassion?’ 21:4 Hypatia (2006) pp. 106-107. 
36 Nussbaum, Martha C., ‘Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism’ 20:2 
Political Theory (1992) pp. 238-239. 
37 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) p. 424. 
38 Porter, Elisabeth, ‘Can Politics Practice Compassion?’ 21:4 Hypatia (2006) p. 102. 
39 von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 Nursing Inquiry 
(2000) p. 169. 
40 Whitebrook, Maureen, ‘Compassion as a Political Virtue’ 50 Political Studies (2002) p. 532. 
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onlooker’s authority to determine compassion. To Blum, it is enough with an appreciation of 
beliefs and values to give sense to the suffering and call up the response of compassion.41 
 According to von Dietz and Orb, compassion does not require us to immense ourselves 
in the others suffering, so that we suffer too. This thought is also found in Bartky in von 
Dietze and Orb. “’To stand with others is to work actively to eliminate their misery, not to 
arrange one’s life so as to share it’. Compassion holds us in the balance between working in 
solidarity with the sufferer to eliminate the suffering while not making the mistake of simply 
transfering that suffering onto ourselves.”42 Carr states that the capacity to feel compassion 
depends on the capacity of entering another person’s heart and mind. According to Carr, the 
imagination required to feel compassion for those like us is little, whereas, much imagination 
required feeling for those very different form ourselves.43 
2.1.1 Pity, Empathy and Sympathy 
Out of pity, empathy and sympathy, pity is maybe the most often used in close connection or 
as equivalent to compassion. Further equivalents to pity are clemency and mercy.44 In what 
follows, there will be a few examples on the scope of theories on pity and compassion. First, 
just like compassion, pity expresses direct feelings towards another and is concerned with the 
person in the situation, rather than with how to deal with the situation per se.45 Second, 
compassion and pity are often distinguished in terms of ‘fellow-feeling for’, or ‘fellow-feeling 
with’. The former refers to pity, and the latter to compassion. The distinction between the two 
is often claimed to be that pity has nuances of superiority which compassion lacks.46 This is 
shown by for example Kathleen Woodward, who claims that pity has come to incorporate this 
sense of the superiority of the spectator over time. Third, Nussbaum used the meaning of pity 
in the original Aristotelian sense when defining compassion. That is; pity entails the 
spectator’s sense that she or he can suffer similarly.47 Compassion is in this Aristotelian sense 
                                                 
41 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) p. 422. 
42 von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 Nursing Inquiry 
(2000) p. 170. 
43 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) pp. 425-426. 
44 Onions, C. T. (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 684. 
45 Whitebrook, Maureen, ‘Compassion as a Political Virtue’ 50 Political Studies (2002) p. 530. 
46 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) p. 429. 
47 Woodward, Kathleen, ‘Calculating Compassion’ in Berlant, Lauren (ed.) Compassion The Culture and 
Politics of an Emotion p. 67. (See also: Carr (1996) p. 418.) 
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seen as a painful emotion that is directed at someone elses suffering of misfortune.48 Fourth, 
according to Carr, “Compassion rests upon an appreciation of the suffering as conceived by 
the one who suffers, whereas pity involves a grasp of the misfortune of which the sufferer is 
unaware.”49 Finally, different way of using pity and compassion is argued for by Maureen 
Whitebrook. In her analysis of compassion, pity denotes the feeling as such, whereas 
compassion refers to feeling accompanied by action. In other words, compassion denotes 
action on the basis of feeling pity. Whitebrook, thus, uses pity for the feeling that suffering 
invokes, and, compassion for the action, if any, following such feelings.50 
 The word empathy has its roots in the Greek empátheia, which means “power of 
understanding things outside ourselves”51. However, this word is a modern word and has its 
translation from German ‘Einfühlung’ (literally in-feeling) back in the beginning of the 
twentieth century.52 Fierke refers to the difference between compassion and empathy found in 
Nussbaum’s theory on compassion. Here, empathy involves an awareness of being separate 
from the one suffering. What differs it form compassion, is that the empathetic person can 
reconstruct the experience of another, but that is in itself sufficient for compassion. 53 
Empathy, thus, works out of a detached relationship or an objective. Hence, empathy can put 
a distance between oneself and another, whereas compassion implies a deeper participation in 
another person’s suffering.54 
 Sympathy has its roots in Greek and Latin and is literally translated as ‘suffering 
together’ or ‘having a fellow feeling’. Marjorie Garber writes, on the case of sympathy in 
relation to compassion, that, sympathy historically has remained a condition of affinity or 
equality and that there was a sense of sympathy as analogues with compassion, especially 
distinguished in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.55  
                                                 
48 Weber, M., ‘Compassion and Pity: An Evaluation of Nussbaum’s Analysis and Defense’ 7 Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice (2004) p. 489. 
49 Carr, Brian, ‘Pity and Compassion as Social Virtues’ 13:1 Social Philosophy and Policy (1996) p. 428. 
50 Whitebrook, Maureen, ‘Compassion as a Political Virtue’ 50 Political Studies (2002) p. 530. 
51 Onions, C. T. (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, p. 310. 
52 Garber, Marjorie, ‘Compassion’ in Berlant, Lauren (ed.) Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion, 
p. 24. 
53 Fierke, K. M., ‘Whereof we can speak, thereof we must not be silent: trauma, political solipsism and war’ 30 
Review of International Studies (2004) p. 474. 
54 von Dietze, Erich and Orb, Angelica, ‘Compassionate care: a moral dimension of nursing’ 7 Nursing Inquiry 
(2000) p. 169. See also: Porter, Elisabeth, ‘Can Politics Practice Compassion?’ 21:4 Hypatia (2006) p. 101. 
55 Garber, Marjorie, ‘Compassion’ in Berlant, Lauren (ed.) Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion, 
p. 23. 
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 A prominent scholar on the subject of sympathy and compassion is C. Taylor. His work 
on sympathy builds on Schopenhauer’s work of compassion. Taylor defines sympathy as a 
primitive response to someone else’s suffering. This notion is founded on the claims that we 
respond to the suffering of another in specific ways without thinking, and, these responses are 
basic characteristics of human life. In the article ‘Sympathy’, Taylor gives an account of 
Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion, where it is said that we are moved by another person 
suffering. It is clear that it is the other who suffers, not we, and we feel the other’s pain as his, 
not as our own. This, however, requires identification with the one suffering. That is to say, 
that the egoism of the spectator is at least to some extent eliminated. Schopenhauer’s 
conclusion is that compassion does not in the end have an empirical explanation and can only 
be arrived at metaphysically. Taylor criticizes, amongst other, Schopenhauer for abandoning 
the empirical explanation of compassion, but also that we, in the case of compassion, are 
moved by somehow directly feeling another person’s pain. Further, in the case of compassion, 
Taylor replaces, Schopenhauer’s suggestion that, the acting on a desire is automatic or 
immediate, with the suggestion that it is the response itself that is automatic or immediate. 
However, according to Taylor, every single instance of sympathetic responses will not 
necessarily count as sympathy. Responses are determined as genuinely sympathetic when 
looking at the single response in connection to a larger pattern of responses in a person’s 
life.56 
2.2 The History of Compassion 
The idea of compassion can be traced back to ancient religious traditions, or even further. The 
religious virtue of compassion found in for example ancient Judaism and Christianity has, 
according to Gertrude Himmelfarb and others, been transformed into a secular one, where the 
private duty of compassion has become a communal responsibility. Himmelfarb ascribes this 
change to the British Enlightenment, wherein some of the key concepts discussed throughout 
the eighteenth century were those of ‘social virtues’, ‘fellow-feeling’, ‘sympathy’, 
‘benevolence’ and ‘compassion’.57 The word and idea of compassion has been claimed by the 
                                                 
56 Taylor, C., ‘Sympathy’ 3 The Journal of Ethics (1999) pp. 75-86. 
57 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, ‘The idea of compassion: The British vs. the French Enlightenment’ 145 Public 
Interest (2001) pp. 3-4. 
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French, although, it was first introduced in the British Enlightenment.58 The leading English 
moral philosophers of that time agreed that the ‘social virtues’ originate from a sense that is 
inherent in human nature. Hume, for example, who otherwise held an unsentimental view of 
the nature of human kind, believed that “There is some benevolence, however small, infused 
into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind;”59 and included compassion among 
the natural virtues. Natural virtues, in contrast to artificial virtues are, according to Hume, 
expected to be reasonably invariant across cultures.60 Another example is the central principle 
of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, namely the idea of compassion.61 
 As noted previously, compassion has a long tradition in most religious and spiritual 
traditions, including prescriptions for living that involves the cultivation of altruism and 
compassion.62 While compassion has a rational or cognitive element, in philosophical 
thought, it is, for example in Buddhist theory, considered to stem from the heart, from a sense 
of generosity, serenity, concern, and caring for another. Further, it involves both feeling and 
action, sharing in someone else’s suffering and reaching out and giving to this other. When 
drawing on several prominent scholars in the field of compassion in Buddhist theory, Judith 
White summarizes compassion as heartfelt. It further “implies an opening of the heart to 
others, acting upon an authentic deep caring for others, stemming form a sense of an 
undoubtable connectedness to all living beings.”63 This foundation of compassion in 
Buddhism, and other religions, is used in a variety of studies64 aiming at evaluating the extent 
to which people are compassionate. 
2.3 Politics and Compassion 
In the article ‘Can Politics Practice Compassion’, Elisabeth Porter argues that a politics of 
compassion is both necessary and possible. Porter develops a politics of compassion when 
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63 White, Judith, ‘Ethical Comportment in Organizations: A Synthesis of The Feminist Ethic of Care and the 
Buddhist Ethic of Compassion’ 12 International Journal of Value-Based Management (1999) p. 115. 
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extending debates on feminist care ethics to the political realm. Her aim is to argue that “a 
focus on compassion fosters a more thorough ethical response to politics”. To Porter’s politics 
of compassion, which extends to a political domain in which we do not personally know the 
people suffering, there is a moral requirement of compassion included. Further, it assumes a 
shared humanity of vulnerable, interconnected people. A politics of compassion requires 
emotions and particular, practical responses to various expressions of vulnerability. Moreover, 
Porter seeks to show how the politics of compassion is premised on a common humanity.65 
 The term compassion organizing, in the process where individuals in an organization 
feel, notice and respond to human pain in a coordinated way, Jane E. Dutton and others have 
conducted studies in order to predict the patterns of organizational response. The theory of 
this process specifies five mechanisms, including enabling of attention, trust and emotion, 
symbolic enrichment, and agents improvising structures. In a study Dutton and others define 
compassion organizing as “a collective response to a particular incident of human suffering 
that entails the coordination of individual compassion in a particular organizational context.” 
Further, they do not assume that there are compassionate organizations per se. Instead they 
examine how compassion organizing unfolds and develops an induced theory of compassion 
organizing.66 However, since it is not the scope of this study to look at the emergence of 
compassion, compassion organizing will not be further investigated. 
 “In all organizations individuals have the opportunity to be kind, compassionate, and 
caring to others, treating others with respect and helping them.”67 “To practice care and 
compassion in everyday organizational life, while perhaps natural to some, for many seems 
difficult if not impossible.”68 
 Habermas’ theory on deliberative democracy reflects a notion of interconnectedness 
between people. This theory consists out of the ideal community of communication. In this 
communicational situation, every individual is on its own, and, at the same time embedded in 
a context.69 Stepehn Hobden and Richard Wyn Jones give an account on Habermas’ theory on 
democracy in ‘Marxist Theories of International Relations’. According to Hobden and Jones, 
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the central point regarding political practice in Habermas’ thought is found in radical 
democracy. In this theory, participation in democracy is not confined within state borders. 
Both rights and obligations, therefore, extend beyond these borders.70 Justice, in this theory is 
reached between rational, equal and free human beings and seeks the universality of interests. 
Moreover, consensus on a matter is produced through argumentation, not by power politics.71 
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3 Human Rights 
In the English language ‘right’ has two principle political and moral senses; rectitude and 
entitlement. The former refers to something being right and impose the duty-bearer with an 
obligation to do the right thing. On the other hand, entitlement is the narrower sense of right 
and refers to someone having a right. As for the latter, one is “armed with claims that have a 
special force. The focus is on the relationship between right-holder and duty-bearer.”72 It is 
widely held that rights give a person something to stand on in that they provide protection of 
interests against other persons and against the state. More specifically, they are rights to 
something that is rather determined and can be distributed to all right-holders alike.73  
 Human rights are rights that individuals enjoy simply by virtue of being human.74 These 
are inherently universal, non-conditional rights, concerned with protecting the worth and 
dignity of all human beings.75 Further, human rights are equal and inalienable rights76 and do 
not depend on the moral and legal practices inherent in different communities.77 Nevertheless, 
the universality of both the nature and the notion of human rights remain highly contested.78 
 The various types of human rights are generally categorised in three generations, where 
the first generation rights refer to civil and political rights, the second generation rights refer 
to economic, social and cultural rights and the third generation rights refer to solidarity rights. 
Out of these, the human rights regime is centred primarily on the first generation rights.79 The 
three generation rights are founded in wide scale regional and global treaties. The single 
universal international organization in the international system,80 the United Nations (UN), 
has since the start drafted and adopted some 100 international instruments on human rights.81 
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However, unless the treaties represent customary international law, they are only binding on 
the parties that have ratified them.82  
 When the UN General Assembly first adopted the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948, “a decisive step in codifying the emerging view that the way in which states 
treat their own citizens” … as … “not only a legitimate international concern but subject to 
international standards” was undertaken.83 “The human rights strategy of control has had two 
principal dimensions. Negatively, it prohibits a wide range of state interferences in the 
personal, social and political lives of citizens, acting both individually and collectively. But 
beyond carving our zones of state exclusion, human rights place the people above and in 
positive control of their government. Political authority is vested in a free citizenry endowed 
with extensive rights of political participation.” 84  
 Human rights are rights that private actors, states and governments are required to 
respect.85 Further, these rights are assisted by moral norms implying that human rights only 
can exist when substantive moral norms exist in some sense. The consequence drawn hereof 
is, that, if human rights are to serve their role in international politics they have to comprise 
norms that are acknowledged worldwide.86 
3.1 The History of Human Rights 
The human rights regime, in the discourse of international relations, is a product of the 
conclusion of the Second World War. Even though, as a philosophical matter, the notion of 
human rights is ancient.87 The idea of human rights first entered the main stream of political 
practice and theory in seventeenth-century Europe. Many societies and cultures have shared 
principles such as compassion, fairness, equity and respect for one’s fellow human beings. 
Not often, however, have these values been realized through equal and inalienable universal 
rights.88 
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 As noted previously, it was in the aftermath of the Second World War that the first 
international documents for the protection of human rights were adopted by the United 
Nations.89 The adoption of both the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) mark what has been said to be the beginning of a global 
human rights regime. Throughout the post-war period, the human rights agenda evolved and 
expanded considerably, a process which accelerated during the post-Cold War period.90 A 
fundamental role in this development of new international human rights instruments is played 
by the United Nations,91 but also by various regional actors. However, the state, given its 
political dominance in international relations, remains the central institution for effectively 
implementing international human rights.92 
3.2 The Sovereign State 
As presented in the previous, the international human rights treaties establish rights for 
individuals. However, the obligations they create are for states, and for their own nationals. 
Consequently, the international human rights regime monitors the relations between the state 
and its citizens. As for foreign states, they have no obligation, in terms of human rights, to 
protect foreign citizens abroad.93 These principles spring from the time of the drafting of the 
UN Charter, when the underlying notion of human rights principles was the conviction that 
there was “a clear link between good governance and the maintenance of international peace 
and security.” The structure of a world of nation-states is based on the Westphalian 
conception of authority, where the sovereignty of a state claimed by its government was not 
interrelated with the treatment of its own citizens. However, later on as “a consequence of the 
experiences of totalitarianism, governments recognized that there was a need to challenge the 
Westphalian model of unlimited sovereignty.” It was in these rising human rights norms, that 
the accord that states must be held responsible for their behaviour emerged.94 Even though 
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sovereignty remained at the core of the society of states, its meaning was modified95 and an 
important example, as the first attempt in the world order to set out fairly strict limits of what 
was to be tolerated by the various internal regimes, was imposed. It has been suggested that 
due to the raft of the international and regional treaties that followed, “virtually all areas of the 
domestic structure of states are covered by some kind of international standard-setting.”96 
However, the fact that nation-states dominate the international order and that the state plays a 
dual role of both the violator and the protector of human rights makes it difficult for 
individuals to challenge.97 
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4 The Liberal State 
4.1 The State 
The state98, or the nation-state, developed out of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
is today the basic unit of organization in the international system with the greatest influence 
over the organisation and functions of the system.99 There are principle characteristics to the 
modern state agreed upon by most philosophers, lawyers, historians and others. These are; (1) 
There is territory, (2) there is a single effective and legitimate government, (3) there is a 
population, and, (4) the state is politically and legally independent from other states by which 
its sovereignty is recognized. For example, a state without a long term territory is 
inconceivable, as is a state without a population. Thus, the conditions of the state are both 
necessary and sufficient, there is vagueness about what counts as fulfilling these conditions. 
Moreover, the future of the state, in the light of increasing moral cosmopolitanism and 
globalisation, is challenged, as is the value of the state.  
 The state conduct a wide range of activities where imposing punishments, defending its 
members from aggression, protecting the rights of its members and providing essential social 
services, are a few.100 Still, there is a controversy over the role of the state. This will not be 
examined further in this sequence. However, in what follows on the description of the liberal 
state, more specifically. 
 There is a variety of categorisations used to classify states. This can be exemplified with 
some political classifications such as; ‘weak’/‘powerful’, ‘radical’/‘conservative’, 
‘patron’/‘client’, ‘modern’/‘traditional’ and ‘developed’/‘developing’.101 The politics of states 
are founded on various ideologies, intertwined and applied to different extent in different 
states. Three dominant approaches in our times are liberalism, realism and an updated form of 
idealism labelled as constructivism. Liberalism focuses on the turbulence of democratic 
transitions and the rising numbers of democracies. The focus of realism is on the shifting of 
power amongst states that compete for power and security, and, idealism is the ideology 
which illuminates the changing norms of human rights, sovereignty and international justice 
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in politics.102 The conventional label of states, are for instance democratic, communist and 
authoritarian. Since the end of the Second World War and even more so, over recent years, in 
global events, these conventional labels of states are to a much lesser extent applicable. 
During this new political order, new patterns of relationships, between states and societies, 
have emerged. Mehran Kamrava distinguishes between four distinct types of states in this 
‘New World Order’ based on the nexus with society and their component institutions. These 
are; (1) First World democracies with historical longlivity, (2) more recent democracies born 
out of the democratisation processes of the 1970s and 1980s, (3) proto- or quasidemocracies 
using democratic mechanisms and political parties, but, lacking the spirit of democracy, and, 
(4) non-democratic states, constituted either of bureaucratic-authoritarian or inclusionary 
populist regimes.103 The liberal state is, in this paper, equivalent with one of the first two 
types of states that Kamrava distinguishes between. These are, according to Kamrava, 
democratic states “marked by open and consensual patterns of interaction with their 
respective societies”, whereas the state-society interactions in quasi-democracies are minimal 
and do not extend beyond certain elites. As for the authoritarian and inclusionary states, these 
are non-democratic in the sense that the flow of influence is strictly form state to society.104 
There is a high level of tolerance of differences between states in the international order. 105 
There are no particular principles of legitimacy or restrictions of constitutional form. 
Although, there is an expectation that the states should, in some sense, be democratic.106 
 Generally, states are not responsible for the circumstances of outsiders of the state. 
Adding to this, the state is entitled to advance the wellbeing of its citizens in preference to the 
wellbeing of others. The role of the decision makers in a state is to fulfil their nation’s 
interests. Thus, the interests in a domestic political system are then projected as the country’s 
foreign policy. 107 
 Moreover, it should be noted, that the state is not the same as its government or its 
society. The government is the state’s administrative organ acting in its name, whereas, the 
state is the political aspect of the society. The state constitutes society alongside with other 
social institutions, such as religious and economic groups. The degree to which the state 
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permits independence to, these and other, social institutions is part of what distinguishes the 
liberal state from the totalitarian state.108 
4.2 The Liberal Concept of the State 
As noted in the previous, the liberal state is, in this paper, equivalent to the democratic liberal 
state. The implication of the liberal state as democratic 109 is widely undertaken.110 The 
debate, on the relationship between democracy, citizenship and the nation-state, was first 
innated in the nineteenth century.111 
 In a formal sense, liberal democracy “is a system of representative government by 
majority rule in which some individual rights are nonetheless protected from interference by 
the state and cannot be restricted even by an electoral majority.” Notably, liberal democracy is 
not equivalent to just any system of majority rule. As we have seen in the previous, there are 
states that operate in an illiberal fashion.112 
 In modern liberal states, both individual rights and popular sovereignty are the doctrines 
that found the state113 and it is the relationship between the state and the individual that 
defines its legitimacy.114 Furthermore, the function of the state government is to facilitate the 
interests of individuals, not to judge or try to replace them.115 Neither is it the task of the state 
to craft virtuous citizens. The state has to remain neutral and not promote virtue,116 but, rather 
to protect the diversity of social interests.117 
 The source of the natural rights theory of the liberal state derives from Locke. In the 
context of this paper, Locke is, in terms of defining the state, highly interesting. John Scott 
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discusses the terms on which Locke defines the state, which is not solemnly in terms of a 
single sovereign authority, but rather, constructing a sovereignless commonwealth where 
several claimants to supreme authority coexist. These are the society or the people, the 
naturally free individual, the executive, and the legislative118.119 
 Another theorist who has made significant contributions to the theory of the liberal state 
is Immanuel Kant. In the Kantian spirit, Matthias Mahlmann argues, that a system of 
freedoms only is a legitimate system of freedoms, when it is universally realisable. Implicit in 
this doctrine is that every single human being counts and only when the distribution of 
liberties is equal, it is justified.120 
 In recent years, a new generation of liberal theorist have emerged challenging the 
classical concept of the liberal state. In a book review of Peter Berkowitz’s ‘Virtue and the 
Making of Modern Liberalism’, Kenneth L. Grasso, brings up thinkers such as William 
Galston and Stephen Macedo, who are amongst those who acknowledge that liberal states 
depend upon a particular set of virtues, which they do not produce automatically. Their work 
is directed towards dependence of liberal societies on nongovernmental and extra liberal 
sources of virtue found in the civil society. They further insist, that, the liberal state should 
pursue liberal purposes, allowing fostering of virtues that serve these purposes. Grasso refers 
to Berkowitz, who examines the thought of Locke, Hobbes, Kant and Mill. In the context of 
virtue of the liberal state, Berkowitz finds that they all in due course recognize that liberal 
states cannot flourish without statesmen and citizens “capable of exercising a range of basic 
virtues”. However, the fear in the context of virtues is that they represent a potential threat to 
limited government and individual freedom.121 The development of the previous discussion 
inevitably leads to the subject of the morality of the liberal state. 
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4.2.1 The Morality of the Liberal State 
A moral judgement is an act either, good or bad, right or wrong122 and usually has a moral 
object or a beneficiary123. There are many obvious sources of moral choices. For example, we 
should do what is expected of us. This notion can derive from a group tradition or the 
majority viewpoint, amongst other.124 
 The fundamental difference between states and individuals, in respect to morality, is 
that states lack the capacity of moral personality and the unity of consciousness that 
individual moral persons are presumed to possess.125 Moreover, the problem of morality of 
states is found in the variety of leading normative issues in the international system; for 
example in the basis and content of human rights, the meaning of sovereignty and the 
obligations of states and their citizens to provide material assistance to others.126 
 In the discourse of moral standards in the liberal state, and other states in the 
international system, a dual moral standard is often discussed. This standard implies that one 
moral standard is applied to the citizens within the state, and another standard is applied for 
the external relations with other states.127 The political philosophy of international relations, 
reflecting the morality of states, cover a continuum ranging from political realism on the one 
side to cosmopolitan views on the other side.128 Since the end of the Cold War, and the 
emerging ‘New World Order’, the basic question regarding the role of morality in 
international politics is, according to Peter M. Jones, whether this new order will affect the 
way in which states determine policy and behave, or if it will only reflect a rising awareness 
of a need to appear to be even more moral.129 In the conclusion of Is there any Moral Basis to 
the ‘New World Order’? Jones notes that it is much easier for states to propose general moral 
principles than it is to put them into effect.130 
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 In order to increase the freedom of citizens in liberal states, law and morality are in 
principle regarded as dissociated.131 In political theories on the liberal state, it is said that each 
citizen owe obligation to the state. Herein lays, the obligation between citizens which 
accounts as the obligation to the state.  This is because the state, in this fashion, is the kind of 
association, embodying the everyday life of its members. Thus, the state is seen as more than 
an external umpire, where it becomes more likely to see it as the kind of association where 
political obligation is assumed.132 
 Notably, there are many differentiating ways to which the concept of the liberal state 
can be understood. For example, Mahlmann, in Heidegger’s Political Philosophy and the 
Theory of the Liberal State, argues that substantial freedom can only be achieved where there 
is a strong concern for the wellbeing of others.133 
4.2.2 Feminism and Multiculturalism – A Critique on the Liberal State 
A critique on the liberal state is found in for example deliberative democracy, feminism, 
socialism, communitarianism and multiculturalism. However, the most frequent critique on 
the liberal state, relevant in the context of this paper, is found in feminism and 
multiculturalism. Both challenge the liberal ideal of political universalism.134 In this critique it 
is argued that liberal states tend to promote liberal principles to such an extent, that other 
principles and considerations are ignored.135 Similarly, the liberal state is not at all neutral, but 
rather uses the term to legitimate, promote and defend a way of life built upon gender, class 
and race inequality. Further, the critique is directed towards the neutrality of the state as a 
false political ideal.136 Advocating a politics of identity, both demand that concrete 
differences of cultural communities and women must be given a place in modern democratic 
states. They further demand that individual rights must be complemented by group rights. 
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This demand is made in order to give way for the representation of difference without 
entrenching or upholding oppression and inequality.137 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
137 Axtmann, Roland, Liberal democracy into the twenty-frist century Globalization, integration and the nation-
state pp. 7-8, 91-92. (See also: Schwarztman, Lisa, ‘Liberal Rights Theory and Social Inequality: A Feminist 
Critique’ Hypatia 14:2 p. 42.) 
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5 Conclusion 
In short, the theoretical framework on compassion reflects on compassion as sympathy, 
empathy and pity, amongst others. The detangling of these terms and their practical 
applicability leads us to an understanding of compassion as a fellow-feeling with another 
suffering. Further on, genuine compassion brings us to respond or, at a minimum awakes an 
attempt to respond, in order to relieve another from suffering.  This understanding of 
compassion, in context of human rights, is translated into a foundation for human rights. Since 
it does not lay within the scope of this paper, to look at how compassion arises, it is easy to 
argue that where there is compassion, human rights have an imperative place. Since the 
foundation for both universal human rights and compassion, in its most used meaning, both 
imply a shared humanity, there is an applicability of compassion to the field of human rights. 
In the literature on the two topics, overlapping discussions on justice, virtue and morality is 
found. For example, human rights are assisted by moral norms, which imply that they exist 
where there are substantive moral norms. This is the realm in which compassion as a virtue 
appears and is directly transferable from an emotion in the personal to the political realm of 
moral virtues. Another example is found in that compassion is in its particular sense an 
emotion in the personal, however it changes to the universal, since compassion does not know 
limitations. Similarly, human rights, are rights that individuals hold, however they are equally 
held by all human beings. 
 When adding the liberal state to the above analysis, the modern liberal democratic state, 
seen as a political organization reflecting its citizens, thus, has the capacity of a 
compassionate politics in regard of human rights. Since the function of the liberal sate and its 
government is to facilitate the interests of the citizens as individuals, Habermas’ theory of 
deliberative democracy is of interest to discuss. In this model of democracy, human beings are 
interconnected individuals. This results in that both rights and obligations extend beyond 
borders. In this aspect the three subjects of this paper can be discussed in a context 
exemplifying the relevance of compassion, regarding human rights in liberal states. 
 In the outline of the study for this paper, a variety of possible research questions close to 
the question asked, can lead to further research. For example; How does compassion 
organizing and other organizational theories of compassion be understood in liberal states? 
What is the relevance of compassion regarding implementing human rights in liberal states? 
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What is the role of compassion regarding implementing human rights in quasidemocratic of 
authoritarian states? What is the relevance of compassion in international relations? 
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